My latest article has been published by Contemporary Security Policy. You can access the online version here and download the pdf here.
It is a short article, part of a symposium discussing European security policy. The idea of the symposium was initiated by an article by Cladi and Locatelli arguing that the European Union is basically bandwagoning with the United States. This article triggered a reply by Benjamin Pohl, who instead argues that the EU is neither balancing nor bandwagoning, but that European security policy is driven partly by a shared liberal consensus, and partly by diverging national preferences and priorities rooted in idiosyncratic political cultures.
The symposium, which brings together the contributions of Felix Berenskoetter, Tom Dyson, Trine Flockhart, Adrian Hyde-Price, Jens Ringsmose and myself, discusses these two perspectives.
I reproduce below the abstract of my own article:
Tools of classical strategic analysis support distinctive explanations for the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the European Union. Looking at the articulation between ends, ways, and means offers a perspective on the CSDP that is different from the approaches usually favoured by European Union specialists or even security studies scholars. In particular, it is argued here that the CSDP is no strategy, and little more than an institutional make-up for the lack of strategic thinking within the European Union. First, I show that the CSDP is not European security, and that the EU security policy is astonishingly absent from the security challenges facing Europe. Second, I argue that this situation stems from a lack of a political project within the European Union. I refer to the classical distinction made by Hans Morgenthau between pouvoir and puissance to show that, short of a political project, we will not see a strategic CSDP any time soon.
I co-authored with Bastien Irondelle (Sciences Po Paris) a book chapter on the French strategic culture, published in a collective book entitled Strategic Cultures in Europe.
This is the first book adopting a common framework to compare the strategic cultures of all of the EU member-states. The product is then theoretically sound and empirically extremely rich, and should be of interest to anyone working on european security issues.
The book can be ordered on the editor’s website.
I published a chapter in a collective book on military adaptation.
My own research focused on British military adaptation during the Afghan campaign (2006-2011), but there is a serie of fascinating chapters (some in French, others in English) on XVI° century warfare, counter-insurgency, the French experience in Afghanistan or military adaptation in EU operations (among others). This collection of chapters offers a large view on the processes of military adaptation.
The book is available from here and in PDF.
My own chapter is written in French, but English-speaking readers interested in British military adaptation in Afghanistan can look at the articles by Theo Farrell, Sergio Catignani and Tom Dyson.
I hope you will find it of interest.
I published with my friend Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer an op-ed in Le Monde, which is a reply to Bernard-Henry Lévy’s call for an intervention in Syria.
The op-ed can be read here (in French).
I published an article (in French) in the prestigious Revue Défense Nationale on “Nato and the End of the Expeditionary Model”. It is available online and in PDF.
Here is the abstract: After twenty years of expeditionary activities, we can see the emergence of a less interventionist posture within the Atlantic alliance. A less interventionist NATO would nevertheless keep its utility as: a communication channel between the Europeans, the Russians and the Americans; a socializing institution for newcomers; a deterrent capability in new areas of collective vulnerability.
The paper is published in a special issue on NATO, which deals with many aspects of the alliance in a fresh and multinational perspective. You can access the TOC here.
My new publication is available from here and in pdf.
It is a paper I co-authored with my thesis supervisor, Theo Farrell, originally commissioned by the UNHCR.
The UNHCR is engaged in a major project to get states to look again at the 1951 Refugee Convention. This is the key international agreement on international protection of refugees. It provides a right of asylum for individuals fleeing persecution but, amazingly, it does not provide any such right for those fleeing armed conflict. The UNHCR wants states to rethink this. Our paper is supposed to provide background for brainy lawyers working on the implications for refugee law.
This paper provides an overview of the whole debate on “new wars”, “civil wars”, “greed v grievance”, etc. and uses six short cases studies to illustrate the effects of war on civilian populations.
The paper will be reprinted as the first chapter of a UNHCR-edited book to be published by Cambridge UP in 2013.
I hope you will find it of interest.
My new paper has just been published by Contemporary Security Policy, and is available from here (behind a paywall) and in pdf.
Here is the abstract:
This article looks at cases in which political leaders have engaged in seemingly inconsistent behaviour and explores how they framed and justified their decisions. After showing that strategic culture is composed of different facets, I argue that when faced with conflicting pressures from the international environment and their own national constituencies, political leaders intentionally manipulate facets of their own strategic culture to legitimate a decision, made for contingent reasons, to participate (or not) in a military operation. I illustrate this argument by analysing in depth the decision-making process and public justifications of the German participation in the European and Security Defence Policy (ESDP) mission EUFOR Congo in 2006 and its refusal to militarily participate in a similar mission in Chad in 2007. This conception of strategic culture as both a constraint and a resource for policymakers reinforces our understanding of the boundaries of strategic culture’s explanatory power, and provides an explanation of seemingly inconsistent foreign policy behaviours.
An earlier draft was presented at the ISA annual convention in Montréal (2011) and won the honorable mention of the Alexander George Best Graduate Student Paper Award.
I am extremely grateful to Keith Krause, Stephanie Hofmann, Theo Farrell, Thomas Rid and Heather Williams for their help on earlier versions of the paper.